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RURAL DEPOSIT MOBILIZATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
Complete financial intermediation implies loan as well as 
deposit services. Both loans and deposits provide income-increas-
ing and risk-managing opportunities to holders of wealth. Both 
loans and deposits contribute to improved aggregate economic ef-
ficiency. Traditional approaches to the development of rural fi-
nancial markets (RFMs), however, emphasized the demand for loans 
and neglected the demand for deposit facilities. Deposit mobili-
zation by rural financial intermediaries, nevertheless, can be an 
attractive focus for the implementation of new policies and ac-
tions to promote RFM development. The USAID-sponsored Rural Sav-
ings Mobilization Project (RSMP) in the Dominican Republic (DR) 
has been an innovative experiment, designed to test the extent of 
the opportunities and problems associated with the mobilization 
of deposits from rural firms and households. 
The DR's rapid financial development during the 1960s and 
1970s was characterized by a strong urban bias. Almost 60 per-
cent of all bank branches have been located in Santo Domingo and 
Santiago, the two largest cities. About 90 percent of all loans 
have been granted and 80 percent of all deposits have been mobi-
lized in these two cities. At most 20 percent of the country's 
agricultural producers have received institutional loans; access 
to rural deposit facilities has been even more restricted. Banco 
Agricola (BA), a public agricultural development bank, has been 
the only institution with an important presence in rural areas, 
with its 31 branches scattered throughout the countryside. 
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Up to 1983, however, the BA had been an incomplete financial 
intermediary, which disbursed loans but did not mobilize depos-
its. Although authorized by its 1947 Charter to receive deposits 
from the public, in the absence of the appropriate incentives it 
had never attempted to tap this source of funds. Rather, it had 
been a "lending window" for the retailing of funds from interna-
tional donors, government land-reform programs, and Central Bank 
rediscount lines. Loans had been granted on concessionary terms, 
in order to reach externally-determined clientele targets. Not 
surprisingly, this borrower-dominated institution lacked finan-
cial viability, did not offered farmers a permanent and reliable 
service, and was overwhelmed with default. 
For the BA, the RSMP was a response to the loss of access to 
cheap donor funds and fiscal transfers in the early 1980s. This, 
combined with inflation, resulted in a 48 percent decline in the 
real value of the BA portfolio during 1982-86. While in 1980 the 
BA financed 254,000 hectares of crops, less than 75,000 hectares 
were funded in 1986. For the BA, the optimality of deposit mobi-
lization was no longer an entirely academic question. With tech-
nical assistance from the Rural Financial Markets Program at The 
Ohio State University (OSU), the USAID Mission in Santo Domingo 
decided to sponsor a pilot rural savings mobilization project, 
based on the notion that funds for agricultural loans can be mo-
bilized from the rural areas, if convenient, low-cost deposit fa-
cilities are offered. It was expected, furthermore, that deposit 
mobilization would trigger desirable institutional reforms. 
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Despite the urgent need for funds, the concept of deposit 
mobilization encountered considerable skepticism. It was claimed 
that rural households do not save, that they would not be willing 
to transform their wealth into financial assets, that they would 
not respond to incentives to deposit, and that the BA would not 
be capable of attracting a substantial number of accounts. The 
RSMP became a flexible experiment to test these hypotheses. 
The RSMP included four closely linked activities: (a) pilot 
deposit mobilization campaigns by the BA and a few selected cred-
it unions (CUs); (b) a general improvement of financial manage-
ment by the BA and the participating CUs; (c) establishment of a 
Dominican research capability on financial market issues; and (d) 
dissemination of the results of the research efforts and institu-
tional experiments. 
The establishment of deposit facilities at selected branches 
of the BA was preceded by a year of complex preparation. The BA 
not only lacked experience in the management of deposits, but it 
was a troubled institution, burdened by cumbersome procedures, 
vulnerable to political pressure, and overwhelmed by loan delin-
quency. In July, 1984 passbook savings accounts were offered at 
the branch in La Vega. One at a time, during the following months 
these services were offered in four additional branches. When it 
became clear that rural deposits were being attracted by the BA, 
the decision was made to gradually expand the service to all of 
the bank's branches. The growth of deposits soon surpassed all 
expectations, as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Banco Agricola de la Republica Dominicana. 
Deposit Mobilization Results, 1984-1987. 
Branches 
Number: 
October 
1984 
7 
October 
1985 
29 
savings accounts 2,628 
term deposits 
20,757 
274 
21,031 total 
Deposits 
('000 DR$): 
savings 
term 
total 
Consumer Price 
Index (1976) 
Total deposits 
(I 000 DR$) 
real terms 
*: preliminary 
499 3,986 
537 2,965 
1,037 6,952 
210*** 296 
469 2,349 
**: As of June, 1988. 
***: As of December, 1984. 
Source: Gonzalez-Vega et al, 1988. 
October 
1986 
31 
36,835 
321 
37,156 
7(008 
2,454 
9,462 
315 
3,004 
October 
1987 
31 
66,570 
14,032 
7,885 
21,918 
375 
5,845 
October 
1988 
31 
97,600* 
47,000* 
505** 
9,307** 
After one year, the BA had already mobilized a multitude of 
small savings accounts in the rural areas. The number of accounts 
continued to grow rapidly, even after all branches had already 
offered the new service, and reached almost 100,000 by the end of 
1988. This is possibly the largest number of savings deposits in 
any Dominican bank and it compares well with the 85,000 loans the 
BA had accumulated in its portfolio over the years, particularly 
in view of multiple loans but not deposits per household. The 
amounts mobilized, measured in real terms, grew rapidly as well, 
even after inflationary pressures accelerated recently. 
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Graduate students at OSU have explored the reasons for this 
success. The BA offered its liabilities at essentially the same 
terms as the other banks, although at interest rates well below 
those paid for funds in the dynamic unregulated markets and, re-
cently, below the rate of inflation. No compulsory depositing 
mechanism was forced upon borrowers, however. Thus, while 60 per-
cent of the depositors had borrowed from the BA at least once, 
only 45 percent received loans during the campaign (1984-87). 
Surprisingly, therefore, at least 40 percent of the depositors 
represented a genuinely new clientele for the BA, which demanded 
only a safe and convenient means to manage their liquidity, but 
not necessarily loans. This was particularly the case among non-
farming rural households. This strong demand for deposit services 
was observed despite adverse economic circumstances in the rural 
areas during the period (low returns to agriculture, inflation, 
and devaluation) . 
The most important determinant of the BA's success seems to 
have been a substantial reduction in the depositors' transactions 
costs. With its large network of branches, the BA was the first 
intermediary to ever offer deposit facilities in many localities. 
Over half of the depositors claimed that the BA account was the 
first bank deposit that they had ever possessed. 
The CUs which participated in the RSMP, on the other hand, 
were not restricted by interest-rate and other banking regula-
tions. In addition to loan expectations and lower transactions 
costs, therefore, the CUs were in a position to offer to their 
clientele attractive interest rates. In early 1985, four CUs be-
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gan to actively mobilize deposits. Within two years, their as-
sets had grown between three and ten times, as a consequence of 
the voluntary deposits mobilized and of substantially improved 
loan collection. The participating CUs were selected on the ba-
sis of their willingness to adopt the interest rate and portfolio 
management policies recommended by osu. Recognizing that these 
policies are an important ingredient of success, the experiment 
will be replicated for about 40 cus in a new USAID-sponsored pro-
ject during 1989-1993. 
Deposit mobilization is generally expected to contribute to 
the viability of financial intermediaries by strengthening bank-
customer relationships and by improving information flows. This 
was indeed the case in the DR. At the same time, deposit mobili-
zation at the BA created numerous "second generation" problems. 
The new deposit services, for example, imposed massive data re-
cording requirements and the BA was forced to revise its account-
ing and data management systems and to introduce microcomputers 
·in order to deal with this problem. However, because of unused 
installed capacity (i.e., overstaffing), the BA was able to add 
the new service at minimal marginal cost. Indeed, less than six 
persons were added to the bank's total staff for this purpose. 
Similarly, the BA had difficulties in rapidly lending out 
the funds mobilized, given concerns about the risks of default, 
and the lack of experience in portfolio management of the branch 
managers, used to disburse targeted donor and government funds 
only. Decentralization eventually resulted in greater respon-
sibilities and accountability for branch managers, who for the 
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first time generated loanable funds locally. Thus, the RSMP be-
came a "Trojan horse" within the BA, which forced many favorable 
institutional changes. 
In the cas~ of the CUs, the most interesting development has 
been a drastic reduction in borrower delinquency, from ratios of 
over 60 to less than 10 percent of the portfolio. These results 
have reflected a change of attitude towards control and the role 
of new constituency interests, as net savers have been incorpo-
rated into the cooperatives, as well as expectations of a more 
permanent and reliable service on the part of the borrowers. 
The RSMP has been a source of important lessons. The exis-
tence of a strong demand for deposit services in the rural areas 
of developing countries has been confirmed. This demand has been 
highly elastic to the net returns received by depositors (inter-
est payments less the depositor's transactions costs). In the 
DR, the CUs attracted substantial savings with higher interest 
rates, while the BA competed primarily with reductions in the de-
positors' transactions costs. In both cases, moreover, expecta-
tions of higher-quality loan services played an important role. 
In both cases, deposit mobilization resulted in stronger insti-
tutions. The task has not been easy and numerous "second-genera-
tion" problems have to be resolved. Moreover, expectations of new 
and substantial inf lows of cheap donor and government funds in 
the near future would rapidly reduce the incentives and weaken 
the will to offer rural depositors this crucial intermediation 
service. 
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